Pepperdine University School of Law Legal Summaries by Li, Hsuan
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law
Judiciary
Volume 34 | Issue 1 Article 8
5-15-2014
Pepperdine University School of Law Legal
Summaries
Hsuan Li
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons
This Legal Summary is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For
more information, please contact Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation












   
Pepperdine University School of Law
Legal Summaries
TABLE OF CASES 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886 (2013) ...................................... 233 
Vance v. Ball State University, 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013) ................. 237 
Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett,
133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).................................................................... 243 
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
Ketchikan Drywall Services, Inc. v. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, 725 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2013).................................. 248 
Gentiva Healthcare Corp. v. Sebelius, 
723 F.3d 292 (D.C. Cir. 2013)........................................................ 252 
Mortgage Bankers Ass’n v. Harris,
720 F.3d 966 (D.C. Cir. 2013)........................................................ 256
    
Spring 2014 Legal Summaries 233
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Sebelius v. Cloer,
133 S. Ct. 1886 (2013)
Synopsis:
Under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 
(NCVIA, or the “Act”),1 an injured claimant may recover 
compensation paid out from a federal trust fund for a vaccine-related 
injury, provided that the claimant’s petition is filed within thirty-six 
months after the date of the injury.2 A court may award attorneys’ 
fees to a claimant who files a petition in good faith and upon “a 
reasonable basis for the claim for which the petition was brought.”3
The claimant, Dr. Melissa Cloer, did not file her petition for 
compensation within the statutory period of thirty-six months of the 
first symptoms of her illness.4 The issue that ultimately reached the 
U.S. Supreme Court was whether Cloer was entitled to reasonable 
attorneys’ fees and costs in connection with her untimely petition.5
The Supreme Court, in a 9–0 decision, affirmed the en banc Federal 
Circuit’s opinion, which allows such awards for untimely petitions 
under the NCVIA.6
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (2006). 
2 Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1890 (2013).
3 Id.
4 Id.  The statute provides: 
[I]f a vaccine-related injury occurred as a result of the 
administration of such vaccine, no petition may be filed for 
compensation under the Program for such injury after the 
expiration of 36 months after the date of the occurrence of the 
first symptom or manifestation of onset or of the significant 
aggravation of such injury . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a)(2).
5 Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 1892.
6 Id.; Cloer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 675 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 
2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 638 (2012), aff’d sub nom. Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 
S. Ct. 1886 (2013).
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Facts, Analysis, Ruling:
From September 1996 to April 1997, Cloer received three 
Hepatitis-B immunizations and began to experience symptoms of 
numbness and strange sensations about a month after the final 
vaccination.7 The symptoms “waxed and waned” throughout the 
subsequent years and Cloer sought treatment in 1998 and 1999 from 
two neurologists.8 However, she was not diagnosed with multiple 
sclerosis (MS) until late 2003, when she began to experience the full 
manifestations of the demyelinating disease.9 Cloer learned of the 
link between MS and the Hepatitis-B vaccine in 2004 and filed a 
claim for compensation under NCVIA in September 2005.10 Her 
petition alleged that the vaccinations she received had caused or 
exacerbated her MS.11
The sole procedure for reviewing a vaccine claim brought 
under NCVIA begins at the Court of Federal Claims’ Office of 
Special Masters.12 The chief special master assigned by the Court of 
Federal Claims to Cloer’s petition determined that her claim was 
untimely because the thirty-six-month limitations period of the 
NCVIA began to run in 1997, when she first experienced MS 
symptoms.13 The legal basis of the special master’s determination 
was section 300aa-16 of the Act, which states that “no petition may 
be filed for compensation under the Program for such injury after the 
expiration of 36 months after the date of the occurrence of the first 
symptom or manifestation of onset or of the significant aggravation 
7 Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 1892; Cloer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 85 
Fed. Cl. 141, 143 (Fed. Cl. 2008), rev’d, 603 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 665 
F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir .2011).
8 Cloer, 85 Fed. Cl. at 144.
9 Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 1892. Cloer was given a “provisional diagnosis” of 
MS.  Cloer, 85 Fed. Cl. at 144.
10 Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 1892.
11 Id.
12 Vaccine Claims/Office of Special Masters, U.S. COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS,
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/vaccine-programoffice-special-masters (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2014); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(a) (providing that the U.S. Court of 
Federal Claims and its special masters shall have jurisdiction to determine whether 
a petitioner is entitled to compensation and the amount of compensation under the 
NCVIA program).
13 Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 1892.
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of such injury.”14 Cloer appealed the issue of timeliness, and the 
Federal Circuit panel agreed with her that the statute of limitations 
period began to run in September 2004, the earliest date when the 
medical community at large was put on notice in regards to the link 
between MS and the vaccine.15 The en banc Federal Circuit 
reversed, holding that Cloer’s petition was untimely, citing the 
language of 300aa-16.16 However, the en banc court did grant Cloer 
her motion for attorneys’ fees, quoting section 300aa-15(e)(1) for the 
provision of providing “reasonable attorneys’ fees and other costs . . . 
if the special master or court determines that that petition was 
brought in good faith and there was a reasonable basis for the claim 
for which the petition was brought.”17 The Government submitted a
petition for writ of certiorari, and upon review, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the grant of attorneys’ fees to Cloer.18
First, the Government argued the Act’s thirty-six-month 
statutory limitation for filing a petition was a statutory prerequisite to 
obtaining compensation from the program.19 In other words, only 
timely petitions were considered to be “filed.”20 The Court stated 
that it found no textual support for this argument,21 and held that a 
14 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a)(2) (2006).  The special master cited Federal Circuit 
cases that were waivers of the United States’ sovereign immunity, such as the 
Vaccine Act, and emphases that such waivers “must be strictly and narrowly 
construed.” This meant that “subtle” symptoms or manifestations of onset trigger 
the statute of limitations for the Act.  Cloer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 
No. 05-1002V, 2008 WL 2275574, at *4, *5 (Fed. Cl. May 15, 2008), aff’d, 85 
Fed. Cl. 141 (Fed. Cl. 2008), rev’d, 603 F.3d 1341 (Fed Cir. 2010), aff’d, 654 F.3d 
1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
15 Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 1892.  September 2004 was when an article on the 
causal link between MS and a vaccine was published in the medical periodical, 
Neurology.  Cloer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 603 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010).
16 Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 1892.
17 Id. (quoting section 300aa-15(e)(1)).
18 Id.
19 Id. at 1893.
20 See id. at 1894 (“[T]o adopt the Government's position, we would have to 
conclude that a petition like Dr. Cloer's, which was ‘filed’ under the ordinary 
meaning of that term but was later found to be untimely, was never filed at all 
because, on the Government's reading, ‘no petition may be filed for compensation’ 
late.”).
21 Id.
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“petition filed in violation of the limitations period . . . is still a 
petition filed under § 300aa-11(a)(1),” and thus subject to the 
attorneys’ fees provision under section 300aa-15(e)(1).22 Second, the 
Court indicated that the lack of cross-reference to the limitations 
period in the relevant sections was further evidence of Congress’s 
lack of intent to exclude untimely petitions from the award of 
attorneys’ fees.23 Third, the Court stated, it would be inconsistent to 
read “filed” as limited to those petitions that were submitted within 
the limitations period; there were “numerous instances throughout the 
NCVIA” where “filed” is meant to include untimely petitions as 
well.24 For example, section 300aa-12(b)(2) requires the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services to publish notice of any petition filed 
under section 300aa-11 in the Federal Register within thirty days of 
receiving service for such a petition.25 If the Government’s narrow 
reading of “filed” applies, then it is expected of the Secretary to 
strike untimely petitions from the Federal Register, but the Secretary 
does not make such exclusions in the publications.26 Based on the 
preceding statutory analysis, the Court was satisfied that the statutory 
language was “unambiguous” in allowing untimely petitions brought 
in good faith, “like any other unsuccessful petition,” to receive 
attorneys’ fees.27 Lastly, the Court pointed out that the 
Government’s reading was contrary to the goals of the fee provisions 
22 Id. at 1893–94.
23 Id. at 1894. The Court cited Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29–30
(1997), for the proposition that it is “generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely” when it “includes particular language in one section of 
a statute but omits it in another section.”  Id. The Court found it significant that 
compliance with the NCVIA limitations period was expressly provided in section 
300aa-11(a)(2)(A), which prevented claimants from suing vaccine manufacturers 
unless the petition complied with the section 300aa-16 limitations period.  Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 1894–95.
26 Id. at 1895.  Interestingly, the discussion of this requirement before the 
Court revealed that the Department of Health and Human Services had “not been 
complying with that provision for the last few years”; but when it was last 
complied with, “it included timely and untimely filings in the published list.”  
Ronald Mann, Argument Recap: Justices Dubious of Limits on Attorney’s Fees in 
Vaccine Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 21, 2013, 10:25 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/03/argument-recap-justices-dubious-of-limits-on-
attorneys-fees-in-vaccine-cases/.
27 Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 1895.
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because Congress had stated that the purpose of the fees scheme was 
to enable claimants to launch good-faith claims, regardless of 
whether the claims ultimately prevailed or not.28
Impact:
The 9–0 majority opinion delivered by Justice Sotomayor is a 
signal that the statutory language of the NCVIA was clear in its goal 
of reducing the financial burden on victims of vaccine injuries,29 and 
thus the Court owed no level of deference to the implementing 
agency’s interpretation of the statute.30 Indeed, Congress enacted the 
NCVIA to set up a no-fault compensation program to circumvent the 
“inefficiencies and costs” of litigating vaccine injuries that burdened 
injured parties and vaccine manufacturers.31 Sebelius is an important 
decision made by the Court to maintain the efficiency and 
accessibility that Congress sought to create in the civil tort system in 
this area of litigation.32
Vance v. Ball State University,
133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013)
Synopsis:
Petitioner Maetta Vance brought a Title VII action against her 
employer, respondent Ball State University (BSU), claiming BSU 
was vicariously liable for a fellow employee’s creation of a racially 
hostile work environment.33 Under Title VII, an employer’s liability 
for such harassment depends on whether the harasser is a 
“supervisor.”34 Where the supervisor’s harassment is characterized 
28 Id.
29 See id.
30 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984) (holding where Congress’s intent is clear, the court and the agency are 
required to follow Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent).
31 Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 1890.
32 See id. (stating that the system was “designed to work faster and with greater 
ease than the civil tort system”).
33 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439–40 (2013).
34 Id. at 2439.
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as “tangible employment actions,” the employer is strictly liable for 
the harasser’s actions.35 Where a non-supervisorial employee 
commits the harassment, the accuser has the additional burden of 
proving that the employer was “negligent in controlling working 
conditions” before vicarious liability may attach to the employer.36
In their 2006 pleadings filed with the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of Indiana, Vance and BSU disputed the issue of 
whether or not Vance’s harasser was her supervisor for purposes of 
Title VII.37 The district court held in BSU’s favor, finding Vance’s 
harasser was not a supervisor under the Seventh Circuit’s definition, 
which requires supervisors to possess “the power to hire, fire, 
demote, promote, transfer, or discipline an employee.”38 The 
Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding steady to its established precedent 
that was in conflict with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission’s (EEOC) standard.39 The U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to provide guidance for lower courts.40
Facts, Analysis, Ruling:
Vance, an African-American woman, worked as a full-time 
catering assistant at a division of BSU’s dining services.41 In late 
2005 and early 2006, Vance filed internal complaints and charges 
with the EEOC against BSU.42 Among her complaints and charges 
of racial harassment and retaliation, many pertained to a Caucasian 
female employee, Saundra Davis, who served as a catering specialist 
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 2440.
38 Id. (quoting Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 335 (7th Cir. 2002)).
39 Id. at 2443.  The Second and Fourth Circuits follow the EEOC’s standard, 
while the First, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have advocated for the bright-line rule 
of defining a supervisor as one who has “the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, 
transfer, or discipline the victim.”  Id.
40 Id.  The Court was notably concerned about providing “reasonably clear jury 
instructions in employment discrimination cases,” citing the opinions of courts and 
commentators.  Id. at 2451; see also id. at 2451 n.13 (citing cases and law articles 
that discuss the necessity of simplified, straightforward jury instructions in 
employment discrimination cases).
41 Id. at 2439.
42 Id.
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in Vance’s division.43 BSU attempted to address the problem but 
was unsuccessful in resolving the grievances and Vance filed suit in 
federal district court in 2006.44 Her complaint alleged that Davis was 
her supervisor and BSU was vicariously liable for the racially hostile 
work environment that Davis created.45 The district court found 
against Vance in summary judgment, holding that BSU was not 
vicariously liable because Davis was not Vance’s supervisor under 
the “hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline” standard of 
the Seventh Circuit; and moreover, BSU was not liable in negligence 
“because it responded reasonably to the incidents of which it was 
aware.”46 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the ruling.47
At the U.S. Supreme Court, Vance argued that the general 
and legal usage of “supervisor” supported her claim that Davis was 
her supervisor.48 As the Court noted, a dictionary entry defines the 
term as “one who inspects and directs the work of others.”49 Vance 
pointed out that Davis’s job description gave her leadership 
responsibilities, and there was evidence that Vance and other kitchen 
employees were “at times led or directed” by Davis.50 However, the 
Court was able to show that varying uses of the word in other 
dictionaries and legal authority existed so as to arrive at the 
conclusion that Vance’s argument was not compelling.51
The Court then discussed at length its previously-established 
framework of when an employer can be vicariously liable,52
43 Id.
44 Id. at 2440.
45 Id.
46 Id. (citing Vance v. Ball State Univ., 2008 WL 4247836, at *15–16 (S.D. 
Ind. Sept. 8, 2010)).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 2444.
49 Id. (quoting 17 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 245 (2d ed. 1989)).
50 Id. at 2449.
51 Id. at 2444–46.
52 The framework was laid out in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 
U.S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).  In 
Ellerth, the employer hired his victim and promoted her, but subjected her to sexual 
harassment.  524 U.S. at 742.  The Court held that an employee who does not suffer 
tangible job consequences as a result of actionable discrimination may nonetheless 
hold the employer strictly liable, but the employer may raise an affirmative 
defense.  Id. The Seventh Circuit did not have any trouble characterizing the 
harasser in Ellerth as the victim’s supervisor.  Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2446.
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concluding that the “defining characteristic” of a supervisor is the 
ability to “cause ‘direct economic harm’ by taking a tangible 
employment action.”53 Thus, under the existing framework, it was 
appropriate to adopt the Seventh Circuit’s bright-line rule that a 
showing of a tangible employment action against the victim—i.e., “a 
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, 
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different 
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in 
benefits”54—is required before vicarious liability can attach.55
The Court bolstered its adoption of the bright-line rule with a 
policy discussion that emphasized the reasons it rejected the EEOC’s 
definition,56 which the Court called “a study in ambiguity.”57 The 
Court pointed to the EEOC’s position elaborated in both the 
Government’s Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae (U.S. 
Brief),58 as well as the EEOC’s publication,59 entitled Enforcement 
Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by
Supervisors.60 The EEOC defined “supervisor” as one who “has 
authority to undertake or recommend tangible employment decisions 
In Faragher, the victim was a female lifeguard who sued the city of Boca 
Raton for sexual harassment based on the theory of vicarious liability.  524 U.S. at 
775.  The Court held that there is strict liability if the supervisor is the harasser, but 
the employer may present an affirmative defense.  Id. As in Ellerth, it was not 
disputed that the harassers were the victim’s supervisors.  Vance, 133 S. Ct. at
2447.
53 Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2448 (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762).
54 Id. at 2442 (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761).
55 Id. at 2454.  In essence, the Court believes that vicarious liability is justified 
where there are tangible employment actions, as those “are the means by which the 
supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates.”  Id.
at 2448 (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762).
56 Id. at 2450.
57 Id. at 2449.
58 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 9, 
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2012) (No. 11-556).
59 Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful 
Harassment by Supervisors, EEOC (June 18, 1999), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html [hereinafter EEOC Guidance].
60 Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2449.  As with Title VII claims generally, the EEOC’s 
definition of “supervisor” in the context of an actionable harassment requires an 
inquiry in the “surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships.”  Id. at 
2463 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 
Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998)).
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affecting the employee,” or one who “has authority to direct the 
employee’s daily work activities.”61 Additionally, a supervisor’s 
authority must be “of sufficient magnitude so as to assist the harasser 
explicitly or implicitly in carrying out the harassment.”62 The Court 
was especially concerned that this definition was “ill-defined” and 
the vagueness of this standard would complicate harassment cases.63
Thus, in adopting the Seventh Circuit’s bright-line rule, the Court 
was assured that it had simplified an important issue in employment 
discrimination cases.64 With this rule, the issue of vicarious liability 
can easily “be resolved as a matter of law before trial”;65 and even 
where supervisorial status is disputed as a matter of fact—i.e., the 
parties have a genuine dispute about whether the alleged harasser a 
supervisor or not for purposes of Title VII—it is a “relatively 
straightforward” preliminary question that can be easily presented to 
the jurors.66
Impact:
In the majority opinion by Justice Alito, there was notably a 
lack of discussion about how much weight the Court should give to 
the EEOC’s definition.67 In her dissent, Justice Ginsberg noted that 
the Court, as a general rule, affords Skidmore deference to the 
EEOC’s guidelines, which respects the agency’s definition to the 
extent that it is persuasive.68 The dissent pointed out that the EEOC 
61 EEOC Guidance, supra note 59.
62 Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2449 (quoting U.S. Brief at 27; EEOC Guidance).
63 Id. at 2449–50.  Specifically, the Court feared that “[a]pplying these 
standards would present daunting problems for the lower federal courts and for 
juries.”  Id. at 2450.
64 Id. at 2450.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See id. at 2449–50.  The Court analyzed the merits of the EEOC definition 
without considering the EEOC’s expertise in relevant areas of the law and without 
considering how the EEOC arrived at its definition.  Id. at 2461–62 (Ginsberg, J., 
dissenting).
68 Id. at 2461.  The Court in Skidmore recognizes an administrative agency’s 
persuasive power:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the 
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the 
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had the “informed judgment” and “body of experience” in enforcing 
Title VII, and that it had adhered to its definition of “supervisor” for 
fourteen years based on the Court’s guidance provided in Ellerth and 
Faragher.69 Furthermore, the EEOC’s formulation of the rule 
reasonably ensured that ordinary employees would not be treated as 
supervisors for the purposes of ascertaining the liability of the 
employer.70 The dissent deemed the majority’s chosen definition as 
one that “undermine[s] Title VII’s capacity to prevent workplace 
harassment,”71 and questioned the “workability” of the Court’s 
definition.72 Specifically, the dissent argued that the majority’s 
definition was so limiting that it does not reflect the reality of 
workplace: that “[s]upervisors, like the workplaces they manage, 
come in all shapes and sizes.”73 Thus, those supervisors that have the 
ability to assign unpleasant tasks or alter the work environment of a 
fellow employee in objectionable ways may be able to escape 
liability simply because the supervisor lacks the authority to take 
tangible employment actions.74
With the concerns of the dissent in mind, the impact of the 
case is two-fold: not only has the Court created precedent that 
diverges from Skidmore’s mandate, affecting the ability of 
administrative agencies to enforce their regulatory policies, the Court 
has also simplified some of the complexity in adjudicating 
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of 
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants 
may properly resort for guidance.  The weight of such a judgment 
in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in 
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency 
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors 
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
69 Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2461 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
70 See id. at 2461–62 (discussing how the EEOC’s standard applies).
71 Id. at 2463.
72 Id. at 2463 n.6.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 2451 (majority opinion).  If the harasser is not deemed a supervisor of 
the victim; the plaintiff-victim will not be able to argue strict liability but instead 
must prove negligence.
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employment harassment cases—and perhaps, in the interest of 
efficiency, weakened the mandate of Title VII.75
Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett,
133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013)
Synopsis:
Respondent Karen Bartlett suffered significant injuries 
resulting from her use of an inflammatory pain reliever manufactured 
by the generic drug manufacturer, petitioner Mutual Pharmaceutical 
(Mutual).76 Bartlett alleged that New Hampshire’s design-defect 
cause of action required Mutual to change the drug’s labeling to 
provide stronger warnings, which Mutual failed to do.77 The jury in 
federal district court awarded Bartlett $21.06 million in 
compensatory damages on a design-defect claim under New 
Hampshire tort law,78 a ruling that was upheld by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit.79 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the 
judgment, holding that New Hampshire’s design-defect claim was 
directly in conflict with the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA),80 which, by operation of preemption, prohibited Mutual 
from providing a stronger label warning.81
75 See id. at 2466 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (voicing the hope that Congress 
will “restore the robust protections against workplace harassment the Court 
weakens” with the Vance ruling).
76 Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2013).
77 Id. at 2470.
78 Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 760 F. Supp. 2d 220 (D.N.H. 2011), aff’d, 678 
F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
79 Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 
2466 (2013).
80 The FDCA requires drug manufacturers to “gain approval from the United 
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before marketing any drug in 
interstate commerce.”  Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2470.
81 Id.
                                                          
    
244 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 34-1
Facts, Analysis, Ruling:
In December 2004, Bartlett took a generic form of sulindac
manufactured by Mutual to address her shoulder pain.82 In response 
to the drug, Bartlett soon developed toxic epidermal necrolysis, 
which deteriorated sixty-five percent of her skin and resulted in 
severe disfigurement, physical disabilities, and near-blindness.83
Bartlett filed suit in state court, alleging claims for failure-to-warn 
and design-defect.84 Mutual removed the suit to federal court, where 
the jury awarded damages to Bartlett based on her design-defect 
claim.85 Mutual appealed, arguing that New Hampshire’s tort law 
was preempted by the FDCA, the Hatch–Waxman Act, and the 
FDCA’s regulations.86
Specifically, New Hampshire law imposes a duty on 
manufacturers not to sell “any product in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.”87 It is a strict 
liability law that the state supreme court has held “can be satisfied 
either by changing a drug’s design or by changing its labeling.”88
The FDCA similarly requires all drugs to be “safe for use,” which 
has been interpreted to require any drug’s “probable therapeutic 
benefits” to “outweigh its risk of harm.”89 The Hatch–Waxman Act, 
on the other hand, seeks to usher generic drugs into the market at an 
expedited pace, and thus allows generic drugs to be approved without 
facing the same level of scrutiny as their identical (in several key 
respects) brand-name counterparts that have already been approved 
by the FDA.90 The stipulation is that once a drug is approved, the 




86 Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. 
Ct. 2466 (2013).
87 Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2473 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A (1965)).
88 Id. at 2474.
89 Id. at 2470–71 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 
U.S. 120, 140 (2000)).
90 Id. at 2471.  The Hatch–Waxman Act is the popular name for the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 
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generic drug manufacturer can neither make any major changes to the 
drug’s composition, nor unilaterally change a drug’s label.91 Mutual 
argued that these federal laws conflicted with state law because 
Mutual could not simultaneously comply with both sets of laws, 
pointing out that: (a) Mutual could not change the drug’s design as 
required under federal law, and (b) Mutual could only satisfy New 
Hampshire law by changing its label, which was likewise an 
unavailable option under federal law.92
The First Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with Mutual’s 
argument, finding that Congress had demonstrated no intent for 
federal law to preempt state tort claims.93 Additionally, the First 
Circuit reasoned that Mutual had a third option: to stop selling the 
product in New Hampshire.94 Accordingly, it affirmed the district 
court’s ruling and jury award.95
The U.S. Supreme Court arrived at the opposite conclusion, 
finding that federal law preempted New Hampshire’s tort law.96 The 
Court rejected the First Circuit’s rationale for failing to find 
preemption, stating, “Even in the absence of an express pre-emption 
provision,”97 state law may be preempted where a party finds it 
“impossible . . . to comply with both state and federal 
requirements.”98 The Court agreed with the First Circuit that Mutual 
could not redesign the drug or independently strengthen the label, but 
rejected the First Circuit’s suggestion that Mutual had a third option 
of “choos[ing] not to make [sulindac] at all.”99 Therefore, because 
Mutual could not satisfy both federal and state law at the same time, 
1585 (1984) (codified as 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2012)).  Id.  The Hatch–
Waxman Act is a supplement to the FDCA.  Id. at 2494 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
91 Id. at 2471 (majority opinion). 
92 Id. at 2474.
93 Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. 
Ct. 2466 (2013).
94 Id. at 38.
95 Id. at 43, 44. 
96 Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2470.
97 Id. at 2473.
98 Id. (quoting English v. Gen. Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79, 110 (1990)).
99 Id. at 2477.  The Court then discussed at length that the First Circuit’s “stop-
selling” rationale was incompatible with “the vast majority—if not all” of the 
impossibility preemption cases that the Supreme Court had decided.  Id. at 2478.
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the Supremacy Clause rendered New Hampshire’s conflicting law 
ineffective.100
Impact:
Bartlett’s two dissents respectively raised an interesting 
administrative law issue that the majority opinion skirted in its 
discussion: the role of the FDA in determining whether federal 
preemption applied.101 The FDA conceded that federal preemption 
of state law design-defect claims was a “difficult and close” call, but 
the agency sustained the position that the FDCA’s misbranding 
prohibition preempts state law because “permitting juries to balance 
the health risks and benefits of an FDA-approved drug would 
undermine” the FDA’s role in maintaining drug safety.102 Justice 
Breyer’s dissent questioned the prudence of affording Skidmore
deference to the FDA’s interpretation,103 which the majority seemed 
to have taken for granted in its wholesale adoption of the rationale set 
forth in PLIVA.104 Justice Breyer’s dissent recognized that the FDA 
100 Id. at 2472–73.
101 Id. at 2481 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2494 (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting).
102 Id. at 2494 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 2481 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  In Skidmore v. Swift & Co., the 
Supreme Court established its standard of deferring to an agency’s authority:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the 
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the 
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of 
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants 
may properly resort for guidance.  The weight of such a judgment 
in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in 
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency 
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors 
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.  
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
104 The Court extended its ruling in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 
(2011)—i.e., the adoption of the FDA’s interpretation—“that failure-to-warn 
claims against generic manufacturers are preempted by the FDCA’s prohibition on 
changes to generic drug labels,” to apply to design-defect claims as well without 
weighing the strength of the FDA’s interpretation in the present case.  Bartlett, 133 
S. Ct. at 2476–78.
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generally had expertise in administering drug-related federal statutes, 
but rejected giving “special weight to the FDA’s views” here.105 Not 
only did the agency fail to “develop an informed position on the 
preemption question” by receiving and evaluating the views of 
interested parties (it did not communicate its interpretation through
regulations or the like), but instead offered conflicting views on the 
matter in its briefs.106 Justice Sotomayor’s dissent independently 
raised this concern as well, stating that the majority, by “defe[rring] 
to an agency’s conclusion that state law is pre-empted,”107
“replace[d] careful assessment of regulatory structure with an ipse 
dixit . . . [that] treat[s] the FDA as the sole guardian of drug 
safety.”108
Bartlett serves as an interesting judicial representation of the 
scholastic discussion “of the proper role of agencies and the extent to 
which courts owe them deference in preemption cases.”109 The 
majority clearly chose to defer to agency views.  On one hand, this 
decision exemplifies the Court’s recognition that the agency is better 
suited than the courts to interpret how state rules impact federal 
statutory purposes.110 On the other hand, the dissent represents the 
view that Congress’s intent should hold sway with respect to the 
interpretation of federal statutes.111 The holdings in PLIVA and 
Bartlett have strong implications for societal health and drug safety, 
as the decisions have broadened the FDA’s scope of regulatory 
power, and have established strong precedent that gives weight to the 
agency’s ability to dictate the application of federal preemption in the 
area of drug regulation.
105 Id. at 2481 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
106 Id. (stating that “the FDA has set forth conflicting views on this general 
matter in different briefs filed at different times”).
107 Id. at 2494 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
108 Id. at 2493.
109 Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1, 44 
(2013).
110 Id.
111 See id. at 45 n.282.
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UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
Ketchikan Drywall Services, Inc. v. 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement,
725 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2013)
Synopsis:
Appellant Ketchikan Drywall Services, Inc. (KDS) sought 
review of decisions issued by the Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) and the Office of the Chief Administrative 
Hearing Officer.112 ICE determined that KDS committed 271 
violations of section 274A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act.113 Subsequently, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found in 
favor of ICE on 225 of those claims, affirming that KDS was liable 
for a civil penalty of $173,250.114 The Ninth Circuit applied 
Skidmore deference to the Virtue Memorandum115 and denied KDS’s 
petition for review.116
Facts, Analysis, Ruling:
Section 274A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
requires employers to verify their employees are legally authorized to 
work in the United States by filing the Employment Eligibility 
Verification Form (I–9 Form).117 Employers must retain these forms 
and provide them for inspection at the request of federal officials.118
112 Ketchikan Drywall Servs., Inc. v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 
725 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2013).
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 See infra note 135.
116 Ketchikan Drywall, 725 F.3d at 1108.
117 Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (2012).  The “employment verification system” 
requires employers to (1) attest under penalty of perjury that the employer has 
examined the employee’s documents; (2) attest under the penalty of perjury that the 
employee is eligible for employment in the United States; and (3) retain a copy of 
the form and “make it available for inspection by officers” of relevant federal 
enforcement agencies.  Id.
118 Ketchikan Drywall, 725 F.3d at 1108; see 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(2)(ii) (2013) 
(“Any person or entity required to retain Forms I–9 in accordance with this section 
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KDS, a drywall installation company, employed four full-
time employees and twenty part-time employees.119 In March 2008, 
KDS received a Notice of Inspection and administrative subpoena 
requesting its I–9 Forms for employees working from January 1, 
2005, to March 25, 2008.120 KDS responded on April 2, 2008, by
producing some I–9 Forms and other employee verification 
documents.121 In April 2009, KDS received a Notice of Intent to 
Fine from ICE.122 KDS made further production of documents, 
which ICE accepted and reviewed.123 An amended Notice of Intent 
to Fine was served on KDS in October 2009, containing 271 total 
violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) and 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b) for failure 
to provide I–9 Forms for some of the employees, and for incomplete 
I–9 Forms for others.124 KDS was ordered to pay a civil penalty of 
$286,624.25.125
KDS requested a hearing and “produced for the first time 
more copies of identification and employment authorization 
documents” to the ALJ, who denied consideration of these 
documents.126 The ALJ granted ICE’s motion for summary decision 
for 225 violations and granted KDS’s motion for summary decision 
on the remaining violations.127
Upon review before the Ninth Circuit, KDS contended that 
many of the 225 violations that the ALJ found were not violations.128
First, KDS argued that in cases where ICE alleged no I–9 Forms 
were provided, KDS complied by presenting them, for the first time, 
to the ALJ.129 Second, KDS insisted that its alleged omissions “were 
shall be provided with at least three business days notice prior to an inspection of 
Forms I–9 by officers of an authorized agency of the United States.”).





124 Id. at 1108–09.
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either minor or could be filled in by reference to the copied 
documents” that KDS retained.130
Based on a plain reading of the text, the Ninth Circuit rejected 
KDS’s argument that section 1324a(b)(4) unambiguously allowed 
KDS to comply with the employer verification requirements simply 
by copying and retaining the documents.131 Additionally, the court 
pointed out that 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(3) spells out the requirement: 
“The copying . . . and retention of the copy or electronic image does 
not relieve the employer from the requirement to fully complete 
section 2 of the Form I–9.”132
KDS made the alternative argument that, despite its 
omissions, it should be treated as in compliance due to the “good 
faith” compliance provision, which states that an entity is considered 
in compliance “notwithstanding a technical or procedural failure to 
meet such requirement if there was a good faith attempt to comply 
with the requirement.”133 To address the merit of this argument, the 
court had to define “technical or procedural” violations and thus 
looked to Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS) interim 
guidelines on the “good faith” compliance provision.134
The interim guidelines, or the “Virtue Memorandum,”135 were 
promulgated informally in anticipation of formal regulations, and 
thus the court found that Chevron deference was improper.136
Instead, Skidmore deference was proper for a number of reasons.137
First, judging by the detailed treatment of the provision, the agency 
appeared to have considered the issue thoroughly.138 Moreover, it 
defined and distinguished “substantive” violations versus “technical 
130 Id.
131 Id. at 1110–11.
132 Id. at 1111 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(3) (2013)).
133 Id. at 1111 n.7 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(6)(A) (2012)).
134 Id. at 1112. 
135 See Memorandum from Paul S. Virtue, INS Acting Exec. Comm’r of 
Programs, Interim Guidelines: Section 274A(b)(6) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act Added by Section 411 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (Mar. 6, 1997).
136 Ketchikan Drywall, 725 F.3d at 1112.  As the court quoted, interpretations 
that “lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.”  Id. (quoting 
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)). 
137 Id. at 1112.
138 Id.
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or procedural” violations in a reasonable manner.139 Additionally, 
the agency itself relied on the Virtue Memorandum in enforcing the 
employment verification statute for over a decade.140 Finally, the 
agency had relative expertise in determining what constitutes 
substantive omissions for I–9 Forms.141
Relying on the Virtue Memorandum, the court found that 
KDS’s violations were “substantive deficiencies” that could not be 
excused under the “good faith” compliance provision.142 KDS’s 
failure to check appropriate boxes, despite having available copies of 
the relevant documents, constituted substantive violations.143
Additionally, the untimely offering of relevant documents also 
constituted substantive violations, as the Virtue Memorandum 
provided that certain substantive deficiencies in the I–9 Forms could 
be excused only where the information was presented in the form of a 
legible copy at the I–9 inspection along with the I–9 Form itself.144
Thus, the court held it was proper for the ALJ to refuse to admit the 
untimely-produced documents.145
Impact:
Ketchikan Drywall provides an instance where the agency 
exercised its delegated authority to promulgate the law, but not 
through a more formal procedure that complies with the 
Administrative Procedure Act.  As demonstrated by the Ninth 
Circuit’s analysis, such informal pronouncements of the law will not 
be afforded Chevron deference, but may still compel the court to 
accord Skidmore deference in the particular case based on the agency 
and the particular interpretation’s combined power of persuasion.146
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1112–13.
141 Id. at 1113.  Under Skidmore, a court may defer to an agency’s 
interpretation, in a particular case, depending on its “power to persuade,” which 
“depend[s] upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements.”  Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).  
142 Ketchikan Drywall, 725 F.3d at 1113–15.
143 Id. at 1113.
144 Id. at 1115.
145 Id.
146 See supra notes 136–141.
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Gentiva Healthcare Corp. v. Sebelius,
723 F.3d 292 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
Synopsis:
Medicare provider Gentiva Healthcare Corp. (Gentiva) 
brought an action against the Secretary of the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) for violating the Medicare Integrity 
Program statute.147 The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
award of summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, holding that 
(1) the Secretary “may delegate the ‘sustained or high level of 
payment error’ determination to another HHS official” in calculating 
overpayment claims, and (2) the merits of the determination were not 
subject to judicial review.148
Facts, Analysis, Ruling:
In 2007, Medicare contractor Cahaba Safeguard 
Administrators (Cahaba) initiated a review of reimbursement claims 
filed by Gentiva for healthcare services provided between July 1, 
2005, and November 30, 2006.149 Cahaba’s two key findings led it to 
believe that Gentiva’s claims “exhibited a ‘sustained or high level of 
payment error’”: first, Cahaba found that fifty-eight percent of 
Gentiva’s claims under review had been at least partially denied on 
the basis of noncompliance with the requirements for Medicare 
coverage;150 and second, Gentiva received a higher payment as 
compared to other providers in its region for each beneficiary 
served.151
Cahaba then drew a sample of thirty of Gentiva’s claims and 
determined that eighty-seven percent of the sampled claims were 
overpaid.152 Cahaba extrapolated this error rate over all claims and 
147 Gentiva Healthcare Corp. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 292, 294 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
148 Id. at 296.
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determined that Gentiva owed Medicare $4,242,452.10 in 
overpayment.153 Gentiva challenged the payment determination 
before an HHS Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and argued that the 
sampling and extrapolation method was invalid, which was rejected 
by the ALJ.154
The Medicare Appeals Council of HHS’s Departmental 
Appeals Board (Council) subsequently reviewed Gentiva’s appeal of 
the ALJ’s approval of Cahaba’s use of extrapolation.155 The 
language of the Medicare Integrity Program156 statute is written as 
follows:
(3) Limitation on use of extrapolation
A medicare contractor may not use 
extrapolation to determine overpayment amounts to be 
recovered by recoupment, offset, or otherwise unless 
the Secretary determines that—
(A) there is a sustained or high level of 
payment error; or
(B) documented educational intervention has 
failed to correct the payment error.
There shall be no administrative or judicial review 
under section 1395ff of this title, section 1395oo of 
this title, or otherwise, of determinations by the 
Secretary of sustained or high levels of payment errors 
under this paragraph.157
Gentiva argued that, under this statute, the Secretary was required to 




156 The Medicare Integrity Program was created by the Deficit Reduction Act 
of 2005 under § 1936 of the Social Security Act.  Medicaid Integrity Program–
General Information, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/Medicare-Medicaid-
Coordination/Fraud-
Prevention/MedicaidIntegrityProgram/index.html?redirect=/medicaidintegrityprogr
am (last updated Aug. 30, 2013).  The purpose of the program is to “prevent and 
reduce provider fraud, waste, and abuse in the $300 billion per year Medicare 
program.”  Id.
157 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(f)(3) (2006).
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payment error before extrapolation could be used.158 The Council 
rejected this reading as “unduly narrow,” as § 1395kk(a) had given 
the Secretary “broad authority” to contract her administrative duties 
for the Medicare program.159 Additionally, the Council found that 
the determination was valid.160
Gentiva appealed the decision in federal district court, where 
the court applied the Chevron analysis and granted summary 
judgment for the Secretary.161 Applying the first step of Chevron to 
the issue of whether the Secretary could legally subdelegate her 
authority to determine if extrapolation was warranted, the court found 
that there was no “explicit indication” that the Secretary’s “sustained 
or high level of payment error” determination could not be delegated 
to contractors.162 Applying the second step of Chevron, it was 
reasonable for the Secretary to interpret § 1395ddd(f)(3) as 
permitting her to subdelegate that determination function, and thus 
the agency’s position was warranted deference.163 Finally, the court 
held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear Gentiva’s challenge of 
the determination based on § 1395ddd(f)(3)’s language: “There shall 
be no administrative or judicial review . . . of determinations by the 
Secretary of sustained or high levels of payment errors.”164
Gentiva appealed the district court’s findings and the D.C. 
Circuit reviewed the issues de novo.165 The circuit court agreed with 
the lower court that the Secretary’s construction of § 1395ddd(f)(3) 
should be deferred to because the statute was ambiguous and the 
158 Gentiva, 723 F.3d at 294.
159 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395kk(a) (“The Secretary may perform any of his 
functions under this subchapter directly, or by contract providing for payment in 
advance or by way of reimbursement, and in such installments, as the Secretary 
may deem necessary.”).
160 Gentiva, 723 F.3d at 294.
161 Id. at 294–95.  Under Chevron, the court asks two questions: first, “whether 
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue”; and second, “if the 
statute is silent or ambiguous” as to the issue, “whether the agency’s answer is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute.”  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
162 Gentiva, 723 F.3d at 295.
163 Id.
164 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(f)(3)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
165 Id.
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Secretary’s interpretation was reasonable.166 The circuit court 
rejected Gentiva’s argument that the statute unambiguously required 
the Secretary herself to make the “sustained or high level of payment 
error” determination because the statute provided that “[a] medicare 
contractor . . . may use extrapolation” and, in the same sentence, 
stated that “the Secretary” makes the determination of whether
extrapolation may be used.167 Instead, the court stated, “‘Secretary’ 
does not always means ‘Secretary’” because she may delegate the 
determination to another HHS official, and, under § 1395kk(a), she 
may even delegate to non-government actors by contract.168 Thus, 
the court held that the statute did not unambiguously require the 
Secretary to make the determination herself; it was reasonable for the 
Secretary to construe the statute as permissive towards her delegation 
of this duty.169
Finally, the D.C. Circuit agreed with the district court that the 
jurisdictional limits provided in the statute—that “[t]here shall be no 
administrative or judicial review . . . of determinations by the 
Secretary of sustained or high levels of payment errors”—barred the 
court’s review of the merits of the “sustained or high level of 
payment error” determination.170 The court, reiterating its holding 
that the Secretary may delegate the job of making such 
determinations to contractors, rejected Gentiva’s argument that the 
review limitation applies only when the Secretary makes the 
determination.171 The district court’s summary judgment for the 
Secretary was affirmed.172
Impact:
This case reaffirmed the Secretary’s power to subdelegate her 
Medicare functions and contractor’s authority to carry out 
overpayment determinations and use those calculations to extrapolate 
the amount of overpayment.  In the decision, the court explained that 
166 Id.
167 Id. at 295–96.
168 Id. at 296.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 297; 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(f)(3) (2006).
171 Gentiva, 723 F.3d at 297.
172 Id.
                                                          
    
256 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 34-1
“although [the court] believe[d] Gentiva may have the better reading 
of § 1395ddd(f)(3),” the court must defer to the Secretary because the 
statute was ambiguous and the Secretary’s reading was reasonable.173
Additionally, the court found that it did not have jurisdiction to 
review the determinations, even where the duty of making the 
determination had been delegated to another entity.174 This was a 
straightforward application of Chevron,175 and perhaps a suitable 
one.  As then Judge Breyer of the First Circuit explained,
[T]he more closely related to the everyday 
administration of the statute and to the agency's (rather 
than the court's) administrative or substantive 
expertise, the less likely it is that Congress (would 
have) “wished” or “expected” the courts to remain 
indifferent to the agency's views.176
This case appears to be highly consistent with Justice Breyer’s 
guidance.  The Secretary’s duty of determining a “sustained or high 
level of payment error” was precisely prescribed by Congress and 
closely related to the Secretary’s mandate to administer the Medicare 
Integrity Program, which is within the HHS’s administrative 
expertise.  As such, it was reasonable and proper for the court to 
defer to the agency’s interpretation of the relevant statute.
Mortgage Bankers Ass’n v. Harris,
720 F.3d 966 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
Synopsis:
Appellant Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) brought suit 
against the Secretary of the Department of Labor (DOL) for violating 
the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) notice and comment 
173 Id. at 296.
174 Id. at 297.
175 See supra note 161.
176 Mayburg v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 740 F.2d 100, 106 (1st Cir. 
1984).
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rulemaking procedure.177 The DOL had issued an agency 
interpretation by way of an opinion letter posted in response to the 
MBA’s inquiry in 2006, and later reversed its interpretation in 2010 
by issuing an Administrator’s Interpretation.178 The new rule 
provided that mortgage loan officers were not exempt from federal 
overtime laws.179 The district court granted summary judgment 
against MBA, holding that MBA failed to demonstrate the APA 
procedure had been triggered by MBA’s “substantial and justified 
reliance” on the new regulation.180 The D.C. Circuit reversed the 
summary judgment, holding that such reliance was not a separate and 
independent element of the circuit’s two-part analysis.181
Facts, Analysis, Ruling:
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was enacted in 1938 by 
Congress to ensure that employees who work more than forty hours 
per week are paid overtime wages, unless they are covered by an 
exemption provided in the Act.182 Section 213(a)(1) provides that 
employees who are “employed in a bona fide executive, 
administrative, or professional capacity . . . or in the capacity of 
outside salesman (as such terms are defined and delimited from time 
to time by regulations of the Secretary)” are considered exempt from 
the overtime pay requirement.183 FLSA is administered by the Wage 
and Hour Division of the DOL, which is also responsible for 
promulgating regulations that define and interpret the scope of 
FLSA’s exemptions.184 As a matter of practice, the DOL issues 
opinion letters through its website and electronic legal research 
databases185 to announce its interpretation of FLSA.186 Opinion 
177 Mortg. Bankers Ass’n v. Harris, 720 F.3d 966, 968 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 969.
181 Id. at 972.
182 Mortgage Bankers Ass’n v. Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d 193, 195–96 (D.D.C. 
2012), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n v. Harris, 720 F.3d 966 
(D.C. Cir. 2013).
183 Id. at 196 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2012)).
184 Id.
185 See Wage and Hour Division (WHD) Rulings and Interpretations, U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/opinion.htm (last visited Mar. 
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letters are typically in response “to inquiries from private parties 
seeking guidance about the application of the FLSA to their business 
activities.”187
In 2006, the DOL issued an opinion letter (2006 Opinion 
Letter) responding to MBA’s inquiry regarding whether or not its 
2200 member companies were required to pay their mortgage loan 
officers overtime.188 Mortgage loan officers “typically assist 
prospective borrowers in identifying and then applying for various 
mortgage offerings.”189 MBA had asked the DOL whether such 
employees who “spent less than fifty percent of their working time 
on ‘customer-specific persuasive sales activity’” were considered 
exempt.190 In the 2006 Opinion Letter, the DOL relied on its 2004 
regulations191 in declaring that mortgage loan officers, based on the 
facts presented by MBA,192 satisfied the elements of the 
administrative exemption.193 Addressing the second prong of the 
2004 regulations codified under 29 C.F.R. part 541, the DOL 
clarified in the 2006 Opinion Letter that “work directly related to the 
management or general business operations of their employer or their 
employer’s customers” was different from “working on a 
11, 2014).  The website offers updates of the WHD Administrator’s interpretations 
and rulings as well as withdrawals of previous interpretations and rulings made on 
the basis of new statutes, regulations, and case law.  Id.  “Note that rulings and 
interpretations may be affected by changes to the applicable statute or regulations.”  
Id.
186 Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 197.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 198.
189 Harris, 720 F.3d at 968.
190 Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 198.
191 See Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, 
Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122 (Apr. 
23, 2004) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541).  The administrative exemption of FLSA 
applies to an employee: (1) compensated on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not less 
than $455 per week; (2) whose primary duty is the performance of office or non-
manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of 
the employer or the employer’s customers; and (3) whose primary duty includes the 
exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of 
significance.  Id.
192 Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 199.  The letter specifically stated that its opinion 
was “based exclusively on the facts and circumstances” presented in MBA’s 
request.  Id.
193 Id.
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manufacturing production line or selling a product in a retail or 
service establishment.”194 The mortgage loan officers satisfied this 
prong because they had primary duties “other than sales,” which 
required them to collect and analyze financial information to provide 
specially-tailored advice to customers about mortgage loans and the 
risks and benefits of each mortgage loan alternative for the particular 
customer.195 The 2006 Opinion Letter additionally stated, the fact 
that mortgage loan officers used software programs or tools in 
providing such services, did not disqualify them under the third 
prong of the test—the requirement that the exempt employee exercise 
discretion and independent judgment as part of the employee’s 
primary duties.196 MBA’s members allegedly relied on this letter and 
classified their mortgage loan officers as exempt from FLSA’s 
overtime law.197
In March 2010, the Acting Administrator of the Wage and 
Hour Division issued an Administrator Interpretation sua sponte
(2010 Administrator Interpretation),198 without implementing the 
APA’s notice and comment process.199 The 2010 Administrator 
Interpretation specifically addressed whether a typical mortgage loan 
officer’s duties fit the second prong of the test, i.e., the primary duty 
of “office or non-manual work directly related to the management or 
general business operations of their employer or their employer’s 
customers.”200 It defined the second prong to include work that 
services the business itself, including “accounting, budgeting, quality 
control, purchasing, advertising, research, human resources, labor 
relations, and similar areas.”201 As such, where mortgage loan 
officers’ primary duties were to “sell[] loans directly to individual 
194 Id. at 198, 199.
195 Id. at 199.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id.  Administrator Interpretations are issued at the Administrator’s 
discretion when the WHD wishes to “set forth a general interpretation of the law 
and regulations, applicable across-the-board,” as it is a more “efficient and 
productive” way of providing guidance than issuing fact-specific opinion letters, 
“where a slight difference in the assumed facts may result in a different outcome.”  
WHD Rulings and Interpretations, supra note 185.
199 Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 201.
200 Id. at 199.
201 Id.
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customers, one loan at a time,” the administrative exemption did not 
apply to them.202
MBA filed suit in federal district court in January 2011 
against the DOL for violating the APA’s notice and comment 
rulemaking requirement through its issue of the 2010 Administrator 
Interpretation.203 MBA sought to have the 2010 Administrator 
Interpretation “vacat[ed] and set aside” and to have the DOL 
enjoined from enforcing it.204 Under D.C. Circuit law, an agency is 
“required to use notice and comment procedures” if the interpretation 
of a regulation “itself carries the force and effect of law.”205 This 
procedure is triggered when two elements are met: where the agency 
has made “definitive interpretations” and in doing so, made “a 
significant change” to its rule.206 However, the district court agreed 
with the DOL that MBA’s alleged reliance on the 2006 Opinion 
Letter was not “substantial and justifiable reliance on a well-
established agency interpretation” and found for the DOL on
summary judgment.207
The particular issue in contention between MBA and the 
DOL that came before the D.C. Circuit’s three-judge panel was 
whether D.C. case law had added another element to the analysis.208
The DOL argued that MBA had to meet a third element of 
“substantial and justified reliance” to trigger the requirement of the 
notice and comment procedure. 209 The D.C. Circuit disagreed with 
the DOL’s reading of the cases and held that “reliance” was merely 
202 Id. at 200 (citing Casas v. Conseco Fin. Corp., No. Civ. 00–1512, 2002 WL 
507059 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2002)).  The 2010 Administrator Interpretation cited 
other cases in support of this conclusion that mortgage loan officers are non-
exempt employees.  See Nancy J. Leppink, Administrator’s Interpretation No. 
2010–1, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR WHD (Mar. 24, 2010), 
http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FLSA/2010/FLSAAI2010_1.pdf.
203 Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 201.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 204.
206 Harris, 720 F.3d at 969.  The test originated from Paralyzed Veterans of 
America v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
207 Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 208.  The court noted that the only type of reliance 
that MBA had cited was that between 2006 and 2010 mortgage loan officers had 
“become accustomed to the freedom to control their own hours and breaks” under 
their status as exempt employees.  Id.
208 Harris, 720 F.3d at 967–68.
209 Id. at 968–69.
                                                          
    
Spring 2014 Legal Summaries 261
part of the first element inquiry of whether there was a definitive 
interpretation.210 In oral argument, the DOL conceded that the first 
and second elements of the analysis had already been met—namely, 
there were two definitive and conflicting agency interpretations.211
Having fulfilled the two elements of the analysis, the D.C. Circuit 
ordered the district court to vacate the DOL’s 2010 Administrator 
Interpretation.212
Impact:
When formulating regulations, agencies are required to follow 
the APA’s notice and comment procedure, which applies to “repeals” 
and “amendments” of those regulations.213 The D.C. Circuit is 
perhaps unique in adding “change an interpretation of a regulation” 
to that list.214 Paralyzed Veterans of America and its progeny in the 
D.C. Circuit have established that where an agency makes a 
significant revision to an earlier “definitive interpretation,” the 
agency has “in effect amended its rule,” which requires notice and 
comment.215 The D.C. Circuit approach reflects a pushback against 
the familiar practice of deferring to agency interpretation following 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & 
Sand Co.216 In reaffirming its strict two-element test for evaluating 
210 Id. at 971 (“[W]e have always considered it as part of the first element.”).
211 Id. at 968.
212 Id. at 972.
213 Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997).
214 Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock
Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 79 
(2000).
215 Michael Asimow & Robert A. Anthony, A Second Opinion? Inconsistent 
Interpretive Rules, 25 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 16 (Winter 2000).  Some 
commentators, such as Asimow and Anthony, are highly critical of the D.C. 
Circuit’s approach, believing it violates APA § 553(b)(A)’s exemption for 
interpretive rules.  Id. The relevant provision states that the notice and comment 
procedure does not apply “to interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or 
rules of agency organization, procedure or practice.”  5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) 
(2012).
216 See Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 584–85 (discussing concerns that such 
deference “arguably creates perverse incentives for an agency to draft vague 
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changes in agency interpretations, the D.C. Circuit advances its 
purported goal of encouraging greater accountability in the 
interpretation of regulations.217 What remains to be seen is the 
impact on venue selection for agencies and regulated entities alike.218
regulations that give inadequate guidance” in order to circumvent the notice and 
comment process required by the APA).  For the two Supreme Court cases, see 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984), and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
217 See id. at 584 (“[The Court] is certainly not open to an agency to 
promulgate mush and then give it concrete form only through subsequent less 
formal ‘interpretations.’”).
218 See Angstreich, supra note 214, at 121.  Angstreich explains that agencies 
try to avoid amending regulations by bringing enforcement actions in circuits that 
agree with their interpretations.  Id.  However, as “regulatory statutes permit appeal 
to the D.C. Circuit in addition to the circuit or circuits in which the party seeking 
review transacts business,” litigants challenging the interpretations are more likely 
to appeal to the D.C. Circuit, as that circuit’s analysis makes a finding of 
“amendment” more accessible.  Id. at 122.
                                                          
